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Abstract
We outline a mathematical model of rational decision-making based on standard
game-theoretical assumptions:
1) rationality yields a payoff maximization given the player’s knowledge;
2) the standard logic of knowledge for Game Theory is the modal logic S5.
Within this model, each game has a solution and rational players know which moves
to make at each node.
We demonstrate that uncertainty in games of perfect information results exclu-
sively from players’ different perceptions of the game. In strictly competitive perfect
information games, any level of players’ knowledge leads to the backward induction
solution which coincides with the maximin solution. The same result holds for the
well-known centipede game: its standard ‘backward induction solution’ does not re-
quire any mutual knowledge of rationality.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we do not invent new rationality principles, but try rather to reveal what
was hidden in standard game-theoretical assumptions concerning rational decision-making:
1) the player’s rationality yields a payoff maximization given the player’s knowledge;
2) the standard logic of knowledge for Game Theory is the modal logic S5.
It happens that these principles lead to a meaningful mathematical model which we outline
in this paper.
Rendering epistemic conditions explicit is a necessary element of game analysis and
recommendations. Without such disclosure, solutions offered by Game Theory would be
incomplete or even misleading. Game theorists have long been aware of this and have
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studied epistemic conditions under which traditional game-theoretical solutions, e.g., Nash
equilibria, backward induction solutions, etc., hold (cf. [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17] and
many others).
The very notion of rationality carries a strong epistemic element, since a player’s rational
choice depends on the player’s knowledge/beliefs. In his lecture [10], Adam Brandenburger
says:
“What, then, is the implication of rationality in a game? This is a central
question of the epistemic program in game theory.”
In this paper, we offer a mathematical model of rational decision-making based on afore-
mentioned principles 1 and 2. In this model, epistemic states of players are essential
elements of the game description.
Strictly speaking, this model could be formalized within a certain theory over the modal
logic of knowledge, though we will try to keep the exposition informal for intuitive appeal
and comprehension. We will be using knowledge operators as well as other logical connec-
tives as part of the usual mathematical lingo, and will reason informally from the principles
of the logic of knowledge S5.
The application of epistemic modal logic in Game Theory is an established tradition
(cf., for example [8, 9, 12, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25]). In this paper, however, we use the logic
of knowledge to offer a new paradigm of rational decision-making, which we suggest calling
knowledge-based rationality,
or KBR, for short. The KBR paradigm is basically the classical notion of a player’s ratio-
nality as payoff maximization, given the player’s state of knowledge within the framework
of the corresponding epistemic (modal) logic.
There are well-known models of decision-making under uncertainty which assume a
priori knowledge/belief of the probability distribution of consequences of a player’s actions
(von Neumann and Morgenstern [26] and Savage [21]). Knowledge-based rationality is an
alternative mathematical model of decision-making under uncertainty which relies on the
traditional understanding of rationality, utilizes a player’s knowledge at each node of the
game, and does not require any probabilistic assumptions.
To this end, we use the KBR-model to analyze games of perfect information (PI games),
though we show that it can be applied to other classes of games as well.
Technical report [3] contains a preliminary account of the KBR-approach.
2 Rationality: logical format
Player P ’s rationality will be represented by a special atomic proposition
rP − ‘P is rational.’
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Player P ’s knowledge (or belief) will be denoted by modality KP , hence
KP (F ) - ‘P knows (believes) that F .’
In particular, KP (rQ) states that ‘player P knows (believes) that player Q is rational.’
In Game Theory, it is usually assumed that knowledge modalities KP satisfy postulates
of the modal logic of knowledge S5:
Axioms and rules of classical logic;
KP (F → G) ∧KP (F )→ KP (G), epistemic closure principle;
KP (F )→ F, factivity;
KP (F )→ KPKP (F ), positive introspection;
¬KP (F )→ KP (¬KP (F )), negative introspection;
Necessitation Rule: if F is derived without hypothesis, then KP (F ) is also derived.
In addition, we assume that rationality is self-known:
rP → KP (rP). (1)
3 Best Known Move
We consider games presented in a tree-like extensive form. Let, at a given node of the
game, player P have to choose one and only one of moves 1, 2, . . . ,m, and si denote
si ≡ P chooses i-th move. (2)
In particular, the following holds:
s1 ∨ s2 ∨ . . . ∨ sm, sj →
∧
i6=j
¬si. (3)
Definition 1 For a given node v of the game, the corresponding player A, and a possible
move j by A, the Highest Known Payoff, HKPA(j) is the highest payoff implied by
A’s knowledge at node v, given j is the move chosen by A. In more precise terms,
HKPA(j) = max{p | A knows at v that his payoff given sj is at least p}.
In other words, HKPA(j) is the largest payoff which A knows that he gets when playing
j. If p ≤ HKPA(j), then A knows that he gets a payoff of at least p when choosing j. If
p > HKPA(j), then A considers it possible that he is not getting payoff p or higher when
choosing j.
Let G(p) be the (finite) set of all possible payoffs for A which are greater than p. Then,
the highest known payoff can be defined as follows: HKPA(j) = p if and only if
KA(‘A gets at least p when choosing j’)
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and ∧
q∈G(p)
¬KA(‘A gets at least q when choosing j’) .
The following is an easy though fundamental observation.
Proposition 1 [Correctness of HKP] For each node of a finite game, corresponding
player A, and possible move j by A, there exists a unique HKPA(j).
Proof. Indeed, assuming A knows the game, A knows that his payoff will be one of a finite
set of possible outcomes between the worst-case and best-case payoffs. The set of p’s such
that P knows that his payoff given j will be at least p is finite, hence it has a maximum. 2
Example 1 Suppose at a given node of the game, move j by A can be met by three
responses by his opponent:
Response 1, with A’s payoff 10;
Response 2, with A’s payoff 20;
Response 3, with A’s payoff 30.
Suppose that the actual response is 2, which is not necessarily known to A. So, the actual
payoff for A at node j is equal to 20.
If A considers all three responses 1, 2, and 3 possible, then HKPA(j) = 10. If A learns
for sure (knows) that 1 is no longer possible, then HKPA(j) = 20. If instead A learns that
3 is no longer possible, then HKPA(j) remains equal to 10.
Note that if we base our analysis on knowledge (e.g., system S5) rather than on belief
(for which factivity is not assumed), then A cannot know that 2 is no longer possible
because this is just not true! Therefore, 2 will always be possible for A, hence HKPA(j) at
all epistemic states associated with this node is less than or equal to the actual payoff.
Definition 2 Best Known Move for player A at a given node of the game is a move j
from 1, 2, . . . ,m which has the largest highest known payoff, HKPA(j)
1. In a more formal
setting, j is a best known move for A at a given node if for all i from 1, 2, . . . ,m
HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i) .
By
kbestA(j)
we denote the proposition
‘j is the best known move for A at a given node.’
1If, for simplicity’s sake, we assume that all payoffs are different and all HKPA(j)’s are different as well,
then there is one and only one best known move at a given node.
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If the epistemic element of Definition 1, “implied by A’s knowledge,” is
ignored, then this definition reflects the usual maximin reasoning: the player
chooses a move which maximizes this player’s guaranteed payoff. However, the
epistemic component makes all the difference: in KBR-reasoning, the player
maximizes his guaranteed known payoff.
In a yet even more formal setting, kbestA(j) can be formally defined as
kbestA(j) ≡
∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] . (4)
Let us consider the extensive-form game tree in Figure 1. As usual, we assume that all
three players A, B, and C are rational and the game tree is commonly known. Player A
moves at node u, players B and C at nodes v and w, respectively. Each player has the
option of moving left or right, with indicated payoffs
l,m, n
where l, m, and n are payoffs for A, B, and C, respectively. The game starts at node u.
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Figure 1: Game Tree 1
Being rational, B and C choose ‘left’ at v and w, but this can be unknown to A.
Actually, there are several different games behind the game tree on Figure 1 which differ
based on A’s epistemic states, e.g.,
Game I. A is not aware of B’s and C’s rationality and considers any move for B and
C possible.
Game II. A knows that C is rational, but does not know that B is rational.
Game III. A knows that both B and C are rational.
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In Game I, the highest known payoffs for A when choosing between v and w are
HKPA(v) = 0, HKPA(w) = 1,
therefore the best known move for A at u is w:
kbestA(w) .
A’s actual payoff at u is 2.
In Game II, the highest known payoffs for A when choosing v or w are
HKPA(v) = 0, HKPA(w) = 2,
therefore, the best known move for A is w:
kbestA(w) .
A’s actual payoff at u is 2.
In Game III, the highest known payoffs for A when choosing v or w are
HKPA(v) = 3, HKPA(w) = 2,
therefore the best known move for A is v:
kbestA(v) .
A’s actual payoff at u is 3.
The following theorem states that the best known move at each node of the game always
exists, is unique (given different payoffs), and is always known to the player who is making
a decision at this node2: for each possible move, the player knows whether or not it is the
best known move.
Theorem 1 A best known move exists at each node and is always known to the player:
1) If kbestA(j) holds, then KA[kbestA(j)].
2) If ¬kbestA(j) holds, then KA[¬kbestA(j)].
Proof. We first establish a technical lemma.
Lemma 1 For each j,
1) If HKPA(j) = p, then KA[HKPA(j) = p].
2) If HKPA(j) 6= p, then KA[HKPA(j) 6= p].
2Though ‘the best known move is known’ sounds like a tautology, it needs to be stated and proved, since
within an epistemic environment, many different shades of knowledge and truth are possible. It is not true
in general that F yields KA(F ). In some epistemic settings, it is possible for some class of propositions F
to have F yields KA(F ), but not ¬F yields KA(¬F ), etc.
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1) Suppose HKPA(j) = p. Then, from the definition of highest known payoff,
KA(‘A gets at least p when choosing j’)
and ∧
q∈G(p)
¬KA(‘A gets at least q when choosing j’)
where G(p) is the finite set of all possible payoffs for A which are greater than p.
In the logic of knowledge S5, both positive introspection and negative introspection
hold, hence
KAKA(‘A gets at least p when choosing j’)
and ∧
q∈G(p)
KA[¬KA(‘A gets at least q when choosing j’)] .
Since the knowledge/belief modality KA commutes with the conjunction,
KA[
∧
q∈G(p)
¬KA(‘A gets at least q when choosing j’)] .
This yields that A knows HKPA(j) = p, i.e., KA[HKPA(j) = p].
2) Suppose HKPA(j) = t and t 6= p. Then there are two possibilities: t < p or p < t.
If t < p, then
¬KA(‘A gets at least p when choosing j’) .
By negative introspection,
KA[¬KA(‘A gets at least p when choosing j’)] ,
hence A knows that HKPA(j) 6= p, i.e., KA[HKPA(j) 6= p].
If p < t, then, since
KA(‘A gets at least t when choosing j’) ,
A knows that p is not the highest known payoff3, i.e., KA[HKPA(j) 6= p].
Corollary 1 For each i, j,
1) If HKPA(i) ≤ HKPA(j), then KA[HKPA(i) ≤ HKPA(j)].
2) If HKPA(i) < HKPA(j), then KA[HKPA(i) < HKPA(j)].
3We naturally assume a certain level of intelligence from A, e.g., A should be able to compare numbers
p and t and conclude that p is less than t, etc., in an epistemic S5-style environment.
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We now proceed to prove Theorem 1.
1) Suppose kbestA(j). According to (4), kbestA(j) is the conjunction∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] .
For each of the conjuncts,
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] → KA[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] ,
hence ∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] →
∧
i
[KA[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] .
Since modality KA commutes with conjunctions,∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] → KA
∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] .
Therefore,
kbestA(j) → KA[kbestA(j)] .
2) Suppose ¬kbestA(j), which, by Boolean logic and elementary properties of inequali-
ties, is equivalent to
¬
∧
i
[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] ,∨
i
¬[HKPA(j) ≥ HKPA(i)] ,
or ∨
i
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] .
By Corollary 1,
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] → KA[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] ,
hence ∨
i
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] →
∨
i
KA[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] .
In modal logic S5, for any set of formulas Γ,∨
KAΓ → KA
∨
Γ ,
hence ∨
i
KA[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] → KA
∨
i
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)]
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and ∨
i
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] → KA
∨
i
[HKPA(i) > HKPA(j)] .
This concludes the proof of 2). 2
Corollary 2 At each node, there is always at least one best known move
kbestA(1) ∨ kbestA(2) ∨ . . . ∨ kbestA(m) .
If, in addition, all payoffs are different, the best known move is unique
kbestA(j) →
∧
i6=j
¬kbestA(i) .
Let us extend Definition 1 by defining the Highest Known Payoff for A at v, HKPA(v),
to be the highest A’s payoff at v which is implied by A’s knowledge at v. It is easy to see
that if j is the best known move for A at node v, kbestA(j), then
HKPA(v) = HKPA(j) .
4 Rationality based on knowledge
We consider several verbal accounts of rationality and show that they lead to the same
formal model4.
1. Rational player A always plays the highest payoff strategy given A’s knowledge
(Brandenburger, lectures).
2. “ [A] rational player will not knowingly continue with a strategy that yields him less
than he could have gotten with a different strategy.” (Aumann, [5]).
3. “...a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that
another strategy of hers is better.” (Bonanno, [9])
4. For a rational player i, “there is no strategy that i knows would have yielded him a
conditional payoff ... larger than that which in fact he gets.” (Aumann, [5])
5. Rational player A chooses a strategy if and only if A knows that this strategy yields
the highest payoff of which A is aware.
The natural formalization of 1 is the principle
rA → [kbestA(j)→ sj] . (5)
The natural formalization of 2 is the principle
rA → [kbestA(j)→ ¬si], when i 6= j . (6)
4For simplicity’s sake, we assume here that all payoffs are different and we work under the assumptions
of Corollary 2.
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The natural formalization of 3 is the principle
[kbestA(j) ∧ si], → ¬rA, when i 6= j . (7)
The natural formalization of 4 is the principle
rA → [si → ¬kbestA(j)], when i 6= j . (8)
The natural formalization of 5 is the principle
rA → [kbestA(j)↔ sj] . (9)
Theorem 2 Principles (5–9) are equivalent.
Proof. From the rules of logic, (9) implies (5). Furthermore, (6–8) are equivalent in
propositional logic.
We now prove that (5) and (6) are equivalent. Indeed, assume (5) and suppose rA
and kbestA(j) hold. Then, by (5), sj holds as well. However, since the player picks only
one move (by (3)), si does not hold for any i 6= j, hence (6). Assume (6) and let rA and
kbestA(j) both hold. Then, by (6), ¬si occurs for all i 6= j. Since the player must choose
(by (3)), he chooses the only remaining option, namely, j. Hence sj, and thus (5).
It now suffices to establish that (8) implies (9). Assume (8) with i and j swapped:
rA → [sj → ¬kbestA(i)], when i 6= j .
Given rA and sj, we now have ∧
i6=j
¬kbestA(i)
which, together with Corollary 2, yields
kbestA(j) .
Therefore
rA → [sj → kbestA(j)]
which, together with (8), yields (9). 2
Theorem 2 shows that each of (5–9) captures the same robust principle of rational
decision-making5. As a fundamental principle of rationality, it can be assumed as known
by any intelligent agent, in particular, by any player.
5Note that Theorem 2 can be established within the basic modal logic of beliefs K and requires neither
factivity nor positive/negative introspection. Therefore, the equivalence of (5–9) can be extended to a
variety of logics of belief as well.
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Definition 3 [Rationality Thesis] Principles (5–9) are assumed to be commonly known.
The aforementioned Rationality Thesis provides a method of decision-making under
uncertainty: a rational player at a given node calculates his highest known payoff and
his best known move and chooses accordingly. We propose calling such a decision-making
method knowledge-based rationality, KBR.
Definition 4 By a KBR-solution of the game, we mean the assignment of a move to each
node according to the Rationality Thesis (Definition 3).
Theorem 3 Each perfect information game with rational players who know the game tree
has a KBR-solution. Furthermore, if all payoffs are different, then such a solution is
unique, each player knows his move at each node, and therefore the game is actually played
according to this solution.
Proof. The best known move is well-defined at each node, hence the existence of a KBR-
solution for each well-defined game. The uniqueness is obvious once players have only one
best known move at each node. To show that players play according to the KBR-solution, it
suffices to demonstrate that at each node v, the corresponding player A knows proposition
sj (cf. (2)), which describes A’s best move at v.
By the rationality principle (5),
rA → [kbestA(j)→ sj] .
This principle is commonly known, in particular, it is known to A:
KA{rA → [kbestA(j)→ sj]} .
Distributing the knowledge operator, by the logic of knowledge, we conclude
KA[rA] → {KA[kbestA(j)]→ KA[sj]} . (10)
Since players are rational, rA holds. By self-knowledge of rationality (1), rA → KA(rA),
hence
KA[rA] . (11)
Let j be the KBR-move by A at a given node. Then,
kbestA(j) .
By Theorem 1, A’s best known move is known to A, hence
KA[kbestA(j)] . (12)
From (10), (11), and (12), by logical reasoning, we derive
KA[sj] .
2
11
Definition 5 Actual Payoff for a given player Q at a given node v,
APQ(v),
is the payoff which Q gets if the game is played from v according to the KBR-solution of
the game.
Note that according to the traditional game-theoretical approach (cf. [5]), we consider
payoffs at all the nodes of the game, including those which will never be reached when the
game is played.
It is easy to see that actual payoffs at each node are greater or equal to the best-known
payoffs since otherwise, a corresponding player would ‘know’ the false statement ‘he is
guaranteed a payoff greater than the one he is actually getting.’
Consider, for example, Game I in Figure 1. It has the following highest known payoffs
for A:
HKPA(v) = 0, HKPA(w) = 1, HKPA(u) = 1;
the KBR-solution:
A plays ‘right’ at u, B plays ‘left’ at v, and C plays ‘left’ at w;
and actual payoffs for A, B, and C (denoted APA,B,C):
APA,B,C(u) = 2, 1, 1, APA,B,C(v) = 3, 3, 3, APA,B,C(w) = 2, 1, 1.
Game II in Figure 1 has the highest known payoffs for A:
HKPA(w) = 2, HKPA(v) = 0, HKPA(u) = 2;
the same KBR-solution and the same actual payoffs as in Game I.
Finally, Game III in Figure 1 has the highest known payoffs for A:
HKPA(w) = 2, HKPA(v) = 3, HKPA(u) = 3;
the KBR-solution:
A plays ‘left’ at u, B plays ‘left’ at v, and C plays ‘left’ at w;
and actual payoffs
APA,B,C(u) = 3, 3, 3, APA,B,C(v) = 3, 3, 3, APA,B,C(w) = 2, 1, 1.
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5 Game Awareness
We will focus on knowledge of the game, which includes knowledge of the game tree, e.g.,
possible moves, payoffs, etc. Common knowledge of the game tree is a reasonable assump-
tion here and looks attainable by some sort of public information, communication about the
rules of the game, etc. However, the game is not defined unless epistemic states of players
are specified as well (cf. example of three different games on the same game tree in Figure
1). It does not make sense to speak of a solution to the game when the principal ingredients
of the game’s definition, the epistemic states of players, are not specified properly. There
are some traditional defaults, however, such as common knowledge of rationality, which
usually make the game well-defined, but only in a specific, usually extreme sense. A good
example is given by Aumann’s Theorem on Rationality [5] which states that in perfect
information games, common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction6.
We believe, however, that a serious approach to Game Theory would be to adopt a
standard of game specification which, in addition to a complete description of the game
tree – moves, payoffs, etc., includes a sufficient specification of epistemic states of players
at each node. The goal of Game Theory then is to find and analyze solutions of games
depending on all (reasonable) epistemic assumptions.
In the following section, we will try to provide examples of such an approach.
Definition 6 We distinguish the following notions. Knowledge of the game tree,
which includes knowledge of the rules – possible moves, payoffs, etc., but does not neces-
sarily include knowledge of epistemic states of players, which should be specified separately.
Knowledge of the game, which is knowledge of the game tree and of epistemic states of
all players prior to the game.
Our default requirement for analyzing the game is rationality of players and common
knowledge of the game tree, which does not exclude considering irrational players or players
who are not completely aware of the game tree when needed.
6 Epistemic analysis of the Centipede Game
Figure 2 illustrates the centipede game suggested by Rosenthal, 1982, [19] and studied in
an epistemic context by Aumann, 1995 [5]. Player A makes moves at nodes 1, 3, and 5,
player B at nodes 2 and 4. Each player has the option of moving across or down, with
indicated payoffs m,n where m is A’s payoff, and n is the payoff for B. The game starts
at node 1.
6Common knowledge of rationality (or its finite-nesting versions) has been widely adopted as an epis-
temic condition for backward induction in perfect information games ([5, 7, 24]). In the same paper
[5], Aumann states that common knowledge of rationality is an idealized condition that is rarely met in
practice.
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•
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1(A)
1, 4
•

2(B)
//
4, 3
•

3(A)
//
3, 6
•

4(B)
//
6, 5
•

5(A)
// // 5, 8//
Figure 2: Centipede game of length 5
The classic backward induction solution (BI) predicts playing down at each node. In-
deed, at node 5, player A’s rational choice is down. Player B is certainly aware of this
and, anticipating A’s rationally playing down at 5, would himself play down at 4. Player A
understands this too, and would opt down at 3 seeking a better payoff, etc. The backward
induction solution is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game.
The question we try to address now is that of finding solutions for the centipede game
under a reasonable variety of epistemic assumptions about players A and B. We assume
common knowledge of the game tree and concentrate on tracking knowledge of rationality.
This is a well-known issue (cf. [5, 7, 8, 24]) and classical analysis states that it takes
common knowledge of players’ rationality (or, at least, as many levels of knowledge as
there are moves in the game) to justify backward induction in perfect information games,
with the centipede game serving as an example. In this section, we will try to revise the
perception that stockpiling of mutual knowledge assumptions are needed for solving the
centipede game.
According to Sections 3 and 4, there is a unique KBR-solution to the centipede game
for each set of epistemic states of players. We show that each of them leads to the backward
induction solution: players choose ‘down’ at each node.
Within the BI-solution, the players actually avoid making decisions under un-
certainty by assuming enough knowledge of rationality to know exactly all the
opponent’s moves. In the KBR-solution, the players make decisions under un-
certainty by calculating their highest known payoffs and determining their best
moves. So the BI-solution is a special extreme case of the KBR-solution. For
the centipede game, however, both methods bring the same answer: playing
down at each node.
Consider a natural formalization of the centipede game in an appropriate epistemic
modal logic with two agents A and B and rationality propositions rA and rB.
rA = A is rational,
rB = B is rational,
ai = ‘across’ is chosen at node i,
di = ‘down’ is chosen at node i.
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Theorem 4 In the centipede game, under any states of players’ knowledge, the KBR-
solution coincides with the BI-solution, hence rational players play the backward induction
strategy.
Proof. The proof consists of calculating the best known move at each node. Note that
since epistemic states of players at each node do not contain false beliefs, the actual moves
of players are considered possible, otherwise a corresponding player would have a false
belief that some actual move is impossible.
Node 5, player A. Obviously,
kbestA(‘down’) holds at node 5.
Indeed, A knows that playing ‘down’ yields 6, whereas playing ‘across’ yields 5. Since A is
rational, d5.
Node 4, player B. Obviously HKP(‘down’) = 6. On the other hand, HKP(‘across’) = 5,
since B considers d5 possible. If B would deem d5 impossible, B would know ¬d5, which
is false and hence cannot be known. Therefore
kbestB(‘down’) holds at node 4.
Since B is rational, d4.
Node 3, player A. HKP(‘down’) = 4, whereas HKP(‘across’) = 3, since A considers d4
possible. Hence
kbestA(‘down’) holds at node 3.
Since A is rational, d3.
Node 2, player B. HKP(‘down’) = 4, HKP(‘across’) = 3, since B considers d3 possible.
Hence
kbestB(‘down’) holds at node 2.
Since B is rational, d2.
Node 1, player A. HKP(‘down’) = 2, HKP(‘across’) = 1, since A considers d2 possible.
Hence
kbestA(‘down’) holds at node 1.
Since A is rational, d1. 2
In this solution, the players calculate their best known moves without using any epis-
temic assumptions about other players. It so happens that this KBR-solution coincides
with the BI-solution, since the worst-case in the centipede game is exactly the BI-choice
at each node.
This theorem establishes that in the centipede game, the level of knowledge of players
does not matter: any states of knowledge of players lead to the same solution, ‘down at
each node.’
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7 Strictly competitive games of perfect information
The proof of the main result of Section 6 that under any epistemic conditions, a KBR-
solution coincides with the BI-solution, hence rational players play the backward induction
strategy, can be extended to strictly competitive two-person games7 of perfect information.
A two-person game is called strictly competitive if for any two possible outcomes (his-
tories) X and Y , player A prefers Y to X if and only if player B prefers X to Y . Using
standard notation (cf., for example, [18]) for preference relation of player P , -P , we can
present this as
X -A Y ⇔ Y -B X . (13)
Since possible outcomes in extensive-form games are normally associated with payoffs at
terminal nodes, we can reformulate (13): for each possible outcomes m1, n1 and m2, n2,
m1 ≤ m2 ⇔ n2 ≤ n1 . (14)
Theorem 5 In strictly competitive games of perfect information, under any states of play-
ers’ knowledge, the KBR-solution coincides with the maximin solution and with the BI-
solution.
Proof. The idea of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4. Again, for simplicity’s sake,
we assume that for each player, his payoffs at terminal nodes are different.
Lemma 2 The KBR-solution coincides with the maximin solution.
Proof. For a player P , let
maximinP (v)
be P ’s maximin payoff at node v.
We show, by backward induction, that the highest known payoff at each node is equal
to the player’s maximin payoff.
Induction Base: pre-terminal nodes8. At such a node t, the active player, A, being
rational, picks the move with the highest payoff, hence
HKPA(t) = maximinA(t) .
The other player, B, knows the game tree and knows that at least the worst-case payoff at
t is guaranteed. On the other hand, he cannot know that he gets any higher payoff, since
the actual choice of A is possible for B and brings B the minimal possible payoff at t:
HKPB(t) = maximinB(t) .
7In particular, zero-sum games.
8A node is pre-terminal if all of its successors in the game tree are terminal nodes.
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Induction Step. Let v be a non-pre-terminal node, and let A be the player who has to
choose one of the moves 1, 2, . . . ,m at v. By the Induction Hypothesis, for all such j’s,
HKPA(j) = maximinA(j) ,
hence
max{HKPA(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} = max{maximinA(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} = maximinA(v) .
So, since A chooses rationally,
HKPA(v) = maximinA(v) .
For player, B, by the Induction Hypothesis, for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
HKPB(j) = maximinB(j) .
Therefore,
min{HKPB(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} = min{maximinB(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} = maximinB(v) .
Since B knows the game tree, B knows that A has to choose one of 1, 2, . . . ,m, hence B’s
payoff at v cannot be less then the minimal of payoffs at 1, 2, . . . ,m:
HKPB(v) ≥ min{HKPB(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} .
On the other hand, B considers it possible that A makes the best move for A (the actual
choice of A) which is the worst move for B. Therefore,
HKPB(v) = min{HKPB(j) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
and
HKPB(v) = maximinB(v) .
2
It now remains to check that the BI-solution actually coincides with the maximin so-
lution. Indeed, both solutions depend on the game tree and do not depend on epistemic
states of players. In the BI-solution, A chooses the highest payoff given B will choose his
highest payoffs, etc. In the maximin solution, A chooses the highest payoff given B will
choose A’s minimal payoff. Since the game is strictly competitive, the minimal payoff for
A occurs together with B’s maximal payoff. Therefore, the algorithm for calculating the
BI-solution coincides with the algorithm of calculating the maximin solution. 2
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8 When nested knowledge matters
In this section, we offer an alternative to the centipede game as an illustration of Aumann’s
Theorem on Rationality. In the new game, to justify the backward induction solution, one
really needs mutual knowledge of rationality, in which nested depth is the length of the
game.
Figure 3 shows a game which we provisionally call anti-centipede game of length 3.
2, 2
•

1(A)
1, 1
•

2(B)
//
0, 0
•

3(A)
// // 3, 3//
Figure 3: Anti-centipede game of length 3
Of course, the tree in Figure 3 does not define the game completely: the epistemic states
of players remain to be specified. As usual, we assume rationality of players and sufficient
knowledge of the game tree of both players.
Game I: both players are rational
rA and rB (15)
but ignorant of each other’s rationality: neither KA(rB) nor KB(rA) hold. As a result,
both A and B consider possible any move by their opponent at any node. Let 3P (F ) stand
for ¬KP (¬F ), hence 3P is a possibility operator associated with the knowledge operator
KP . Then
3B(a3) ∧3B(d3) and 3A(a2) ∧3A(d2) . (16)
Game I is defined by the game tree in Figure 1, rationality of players (15), and epistemic
conditions (16).
Let us solve Game I. As a rational player, A plays ‘across’ at node 3. However, at node
2, B considers it possible that A plays ‘down’ at 3. Therefore,
HKPB(‘across’) = 0 ,
whereas
HKPA(‘down’) = 1 ,
and B chooses ‘down’ at 2. Likewise, by (16), A considers either of a2 and d2 possible.
Therefore, at root node 1, A chooses ‘down.’ The solution of the game is
d1, d2, a3 ,
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and both players get payoff 2.
Game II: level 1 mutual knowledge of rationality is assumed:
KA(rB) and KB(rA) , (17)
but not level 2 mutual knowledge of rationality: neither KBKA(rB) nor KAKB(rA) hold.
In particular, it would follow from KAKB(rA) that A knows that B knows that A plays
‘across’ at 3. But A in Game II is not so well-informed and does not know that B knows
that A plays ‘across’ at 3, or, symbolically,
¬KAKB(a3) . (18)
Taking into account that it is common knowledge that a3 is logically equivalent to ¬d3,
condition (18) can be equivalently presented as
¬KAKB(¬d3) ,
or,
3A3B(d3) . (19)
Game II is defined by epistemic conditions (17) and (19). Let us find its solution.
A plays ‘across’ at node 3, hence a3. B knows that A, as a rational player, chooses
‘across’ at 3, i.e., B knows that a3. Therefore, B’s best known move at 2 is ‘across,’ since
it yields payoff 3 vs. payoff 1 when playing ‘down.’ As a rational player, B chooses ‘across’
at 2, hence a2.
At node 1, by (19), A considers it possible that B considers d3 possible. As a rational
player who considers d3 possible, B must choose ‘down’ at 2, hence d2. A knows that B is
rational, hence A considers it possible that B plays ‘down’ at 2 and delivers payoff 1 for
A. Therefore, the highest known payoff for A when playing ‘across’ is 1:
HKPA(‘across’) = 1 ,
whereas, by the game tree,
HKPA(‘down’) = 2 .
As a rational player, A chooses ‘down,’ hence d1. The solution of Game II is represented
as
d1, a2, a3 ,
and both players get payoff 2.
Game III: Common knowledge of rationality is assumed9. This level of knowledge is
already sufficient for backward induction reasoning. Indeed, A plays ‘across’ at node 3, B
knows that A as a rational player chooses ‘across’ at 3, hence B chooses ‘across’ at 2. A
9Actually, it suffices to assume KA(rB) and KAKB(rA).
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knows that B knows that A plays ‘across’ at 3, hence A knows that the best known move
for B is ‘across.’ Moreover, since A knows that B is rational, A knows that B plays ‘across’
at node 2. Therefore, the best known move for A at 1 is ‘across,’ hence A chooses ‘across’
at 1. The solution of Game III is
a1, a2, a3 ,
and both players get payoff 3.
It is clear how to generalize the anti-centipede game to any finite length in such a way
that a shift from solution ‘down’ to solution ‘across’ at node 1 happens only at the nested
depth of mutual knowledge of rationality which is equal to the length of the game minus
one. Figure 4 shows a game tree for the anti-centipede of length 5.
4, 4
•

1(A)
3, 3
•

2(B)
//
2, 2
•

3(A)
//
1, 1
•

4(B)
//
0, 0
•

5(A)
// // 5, 5//
Figure 4: Anti-centipede game of length 5
9 Knowledge of the game
In this section, we will revisit the notion of the knowledge of the game and show that in its
entirety, including all necessary epistemic conditions, it is only possible in somewhat special
cases. In all other games, players have necessarily different and incomplete knowledge
of the game which they are playing.
We start with examples. Solving Games I, II, and III from Section 8, we deliberately
did not concentrate on knowledge of the game; it is time to analyze it in more detail.
We claim that in Games I and II, players A and B do not have knowl-
edge of the corresponding game in its entirety.
Indeed, the complete description of a game includes
1) a Game Tree, which is commonly known;
2) Rationality: propositions rA and rB are assumed true (but not necessarily assumed
mutually known).
3) Epistemic Conditions E describing what is specifically known by players, in addition
to general knowledge from 1 and 2.
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Knowledge of the game consists of knowing 1, 2, 3 and basic mathematical facts, together
with whatever follows from them in the logic of knowledge. In particular, each player knows
that he is rational: KP (rP), KPKP (rP), etc.
In Game I, Section 8, E consists of conditions (16). From the game description, we
can logically derive ¬KB(rA). Indeed, it is common knowledge (from the Game Tree and
general understanding of rationality) that if A is rational, then A plays ‘across’ at node 3,
hence
rA → a3 . (20)
In particular, B knows (20):
KB(rA → a3) ,
hence
KB(rA) → KB(a3) ,
and
¬KB(a3) → ¬KB(rA) .
Since, by (16), ¬KB(a3) holds,
¬KB(rA) .
As we see, A knows rA, since KA(rA) holds, but B does not know rA, since KB(rA) does
not hold. Therefore, A and B have a different understanding of Game I, and B’s knowledge
is not complete. It is easy to see that A’s knowledge of the game is not complete either,
otherwise A would be able to calculate the best move for B at 2 and predict10 either a2 or
d2, which, by (16), is not the case.
In Game II, Section 8, E consists of conditions (17) and (19). Proposition KAKB(rA)
does not hold. Indeed, it follows from the Game Tree and the Rationality Thesis (Defini-
tion 3), that (20) is commonly known. In particular,
KAKB(rA → a3) .
From this, by S5-reasoning, we conclude
KAKB(rA) → KAKB(a3) ,
hence
¬KAKB(a3) → ¬KAKB(rA) .
By (19), ¬KAKB(a3), hence
¬KAKB(rA) .
On the other hand, from (17), we conclude
KBKB(rA) ,
10Cf. Proposition 2.
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by positive introspection of KB. Therefore, B knows KB(rA). However, A does not know
KB(rA), since KAKB(rA) does not hold. Again, players A and B have different accounts
of the rules of Game II.
Game III, Section 8 is mutually known to its players A and B in its entirety because
the game description is common knowledge. Indeed, in Game III, the complete description
includes
1) the Game Tree (commonly known);
2) Rationality: rA and rB;
3) Epistemic Conditions: E = Common Knowledge of Rationality.
Since, for each player P ,
Common Knowledge that F → KP (Common Knowledge that F) , (21)
A’s and B’s knowledge of Game III is complete. Indeed, A and B each know the Game
Tree, which is common knowledge. A and B also know Rationality, which is common
knowledge. Finally, A and B both know Epistemic Conditions E because of (21).
Proposition 2 Any intelligent agent (observer) who knows the game in full, knows the
KBR-solution of the game and actual payoffs.
Proof. From the definitions. Since an agent A knows the game, including epistemic states
of all players, A can calculate the highest known payoff and the best known move for each
player, say B, at each given node. Indeed, suppose B’s best known move is j. This means
that B logically concludes from his epistemic state at a given node that kbestB(j):
‘Epistemic State of B’ → kbestB(j) .
The laws of logic are known to each intelligent agent, hence A can reproduce B’s reasoning
from the same set of assumptions:
KA[‘Epistemic State of B’ → kbestB(j)] .
By logic of knowledge,
KA[‘Epistemic State of B’] → KA[kbestB(j)] . (22)
In addition, A knows that B is rational, since A knows Rationality:
KA[rB] . (23)
Furthermore, A, of course, knows how KBR works, in particular,
KA[rB → (kbestB(j)→ sj)] ,
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from which, by the laws of logic, it follows that
KA[rB] → (KA[kbestB(j)]→ KA[sj]) . (24)
Taking into account that A knows the epistemic state of B at this node, from (22), (23),
and (24), we conclude
KA[sj] ,
meaning A knows B’s move at this node.
Therefore, A knows the moves of all players, i.e., A knows the KBR-solution of the
game and can calculate actual payoffs. 2
Definition 7 We say that A is certain at a given node if A knows KBR-solutions for
subgames at each subsequent node.
Naturally, if A is certain at v, then A knows all actual payoffs at nodes that immediately
follow v and hence can calculate the actual payoffs at node v.
Corollary 3 Any player who knows the game in full is certain at each node of the game.
Proof. This follows easily from Proposition 2. The only new feature mentioned here is
certainty, which within the current context is a tautology: if a player knows the moves of
all other players, he is certain at each node. 2
Proposition 3 In a PI game, rationality of players and certainty at each node yields the
BI-solution which coincides with the KBR-solution.
Proof. By backward induction. At pre-terminal nodes, all players move rationally, which
is both a KBR- and BI-solution. If a player at a given node v knows KBR-solutions at all
later nodes, he knows actual payoffs and his KBR-move at v coincides with the BI-move. 2
Uncertainty in PI games occurs only because players do not know the game in full.
Moreover, if uncertainty occurs in a PI game, then some players necessarily have different
understanding of the game as well.
Definition 8 For players A and B, by iterated rationality assertions IR, we under-
stand the set of propositions of the sort ‘A knows that B knows that A knows ... that A is
rational’:
IR = {rA, rB,
KB(rA), KA(rB),
KAKB(rA), KBKA(rB),
KBKAKB(rA), KAKBKA(rB),
KAKBKAKB(rA), KBKAKBKA(rB),
. . .}.
This definition naturally extends to more than two players.
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Assertions from IR are important epistemic conditions of a game. For example, our
analysis of Games I, II, and III earlier in this section uses IR specification in an essential
way.
IR assertions play a special role in the theory of perfect information games. In par-
ticular, Aumann’s Theorem on Rationality refers to PI games with common knowledge of
rationality, which in our context yields that IR holds in its entirety for such games.
Theorem 6 If all players in a PI game are rational and have the same knowledge of
iterated rationality, then there is no uncertainty in the game.
Proof. Will be confined to the case of two players, without loss of generality.
Lemma 3 If players have the same knowledge of iterated rationality, then each of them
knows the whole set IR of iterated rationality assertions.
Proof. Indeed, since A is rational, the rationality of A assertion holds:
rA .
Since the rationality of A is self-known, rA→ KA(rA),
KA(rA)
holds, i.e., A knows rA. By assumptions, B knows the same IR assertions as A, in partic-
ular, B knows rA:
KB(rA) .
By positive introspection of B’s knowledge, we conclude
KBKB(rA) ,
which means that KB(rA) is known to B; by assumptions, it is known to A as well:
KAKB(rA) .
By positive introspection of A’s knowledge,
KAKAKB(rA) ,
meaning that A knows KAKB(rA). By assumptions, B knows that as well:
KBKAKB(rA) ,
etc.
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By similar reasoning, we can show that iterated knowledge assertions of rB are also all
known. 2
Now proceed with the usual backward induction reasoning to show that at each node,
the player knows all KBR-moves and actual payoffs at all later nodes. At pre-terminal
nodes, the players move rationally according to the Game Tree. At the next nodes moving
towards the root, players determine the moves of players at the previous nodes using level
1 mutual knowledge of rationality. At the next layer of nodes towards the root, players use
level 2 mutual knowledge of rationality to determine all the moves at the successor nodes,
etc. The only epistemic condition which is needed for the backward induction reasoning at
a node of depth n is level n − 1 mutual knowledge of rationality, which is guaranteed by
Lemma 3. 2
It follows from the proof that to achieve complete certainty in a given game of length
n, it is sufficient for players to agree on a finite set of iterated rationality assertions with
nested knowledge depth less than n. Such an agreement is only possible when all iterated
rationality assertions of nested knowledge depth less than n are actually known to all play-
ers. We can formulate the same observation in a dual manner: if a player faces uncertainty
in a perfect information game, then there should be an iterated rationality assertion of
nested depth less than the length of the game, which is unknown to the player.
Aumann’s Theorem on Rationality
In PI games, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction
easily follows from Proposition 3 and Theorem 6. Indeed, common knowledge of rationality
immediately yields that each player knows the whole set of iterated rationality assertions
IR.
Altogether, Corollary 3 and Theorem 6 reveal that different and incomplete knowledge
of the game form the basis for uncertainty in perfect information games. If uncertainty
occurs in a perfect information game, players have different knowledge of the game. The
player who faces uncertainty does not have complete knowledge of the game.
10 Strategic games and knowledge-based rationality
In this section, we give an example of KBR-reasoning in strategic-form games.
Imagine two neighboring countries: a big, powerful B, and a small S. Each player
has the choice to wage war or keep the peace. The best outcome for both countries is
peace. However, if both countries wage war, B wins easily and S loses everything, which
is the second-best outcome for B and the worst for S. In situation (warB, peaceS), B loses
internationally, which is the second-best outcome for S. In (peaceB,warS), B’s government
loses national support, which is the worst outcome for B and the second-worst for S.
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warS peaceS
warB 2,0 ⇒ 1,2
⇑ ⇓
peaceB 0,1 ⇒ 3,3
There is one Nash equilibrium, (peaceB, peaceS), consisting of the best outcomes for
both players. It might look as though they should both play accordingly. However, such a
prediction is not well-founded unless certain epistemic conditions are met.
Theorem 7 In the War and Peace Dilemma, suppose the game matrix is mutually known
and the players are rational. Then,
i) If B is not aware of the other player’s rationality, S chooses ‘peace’ and B chooses
‘war.’
ii) If S’s rationality is known to B, both players choose ‘peace.’
Proof. Let us analyze this game in epistemic logic with two modalities, KB and KS, and
propositions rB and rS for rationality assertions. We define propositions:
wB - B chooses to wage war,
pB - B chooses to keep peace,
wS - S chooses to wage war,
pS - S chooses to keep peace.
For both (i) and (ii), we consider the Rationality assumption
rB, rS . (25)
(i) Game I is defined by an epistemic condition stating that B considers all moves of
S epistemically possible:
E = {3B(wS), 3B(pS)} . (26)
This is a maximin case, and the corresponding best known moves can be directly calculated,
or derived, from epistemic conditions and the game description: wB and pS.
Informally, S has the dominant strategy, peaceS, whereas B lacks one, hence B’s choice
actually depends on his expectations of S’s move. Since B considers both moves by S
possible, B counts on the worst cases and hence picks warB.
(ii) Game II is defined by adopting the condition that B knows that S is rational:
E = {KB(rS)} .
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S’s KBR-reasoning does not change, and S’s KBR-strategy is ‘peace’:
pS .
From mutual knowledge of the game matrix, B easily concludes that S knows that ‘peace’
is the dominant strategy for S. Since, in addition, B knows that S is rational (condition
E of Game II), from the Rationality Thesis (Definition 3), B concludes that S will play
‘peace,’ i.e., that pS holds. Since S plays ‘peace,’ B’s moves yield the following payoffs:
HKPB(warB) = 1 , HKPB(peaceB) = 3 .
So the best known move for B is ‘peace,’ and, since B is rational, he chooses ‘peace,’ hence
pB. 2
In the War and Peace Dilemma, our logical analysis shows that despite that
a) for both countries, the best choice is ‘peace’;
b) it is the only Nash equilibrium in the game;
c) both countries behave rationally;
to secure the Nash equilibrium outcome, an additional epistemic condition should be met,
e.g., the big country should know that its small neighbour will behave rationally.
11 Discussion
Knowledge-Based Rationality is different from other well-known approaches for handling
uncertainty in games:
von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), which assumes known probability distribution;
Savage (1972), which assumes known subjective probability distribution.
The KBR-model which we offer does not make any probabilistic assumptions and models
decision-making strictly on the basis of players’ knowledge.
11.1 Other models of epistemic rationality.
The logic of knowledge approach adopted in this paper provides a flexible and competitive
apparatus for specifying and solving games. It has certain advantages over other well-known
approaches for tracking epistemic conditions in games, such as protocols and possible paths
([14]), and set-theoretical Aumann structures ([4]). In particular, logical language can deal
with incomplete specifications of (possibly infinite) state spaces, which are yet sufficient for
solving the game. The aforementioned model-theoretical and set-theoretical approaches, on
the other hand, require a priori complete specification of state spaces, which may happen
to be too hard if at all possible.
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11.2 Rationality Theorem for PI Games
Corollary 3 and Theorem 6 do not really depend on our theory of knowledge-based decisions
under uncertainty developed in Sections 1–4, since they provide sufficient conditions under
which uncertainty in the game can be eliminated completely.
11.3 Relations to Aumann’s Rationality Theorem
What do Corollary 3 and Theorem 6 add to Aumann’s Rationality Theorem? Theorem 6
states that uncertainty can be eliminated (the claim of Aumann’s Theorem) under some-
what more general assumptions: instead of Aumann’s common knowledge of rationality
requirement, Theorem 6 only requires that players agree, one way or another, on a certain
(finite) set of iterated rationality assertions. However, the significance of Theorem 6 and
Corollary 3 is more conceptual. They demonstrate the real power of knowledge of the game.
Theorem 6 and Corollary 3 show that uncertainty in perfect information games appears
only as the result of different epistemic perceptions by players. This makes the case that
epistemic conditions of players should be objects of game-theoretical studies.
11.4 What do we actually assume?
We offer a specific, logic-based approach. In our model, we try to accommodate the intellec-
tual powers of players who are considered not to be mere finite-automata payoff maximizers
but rather intellectual agents capable of analyzing the game and calculating payoffs condi-
tioned to the rational behavior of all players. In particular, we assume that players have
common knowledge of the laws of logic, foundations of knowledge-based rational decision
making, and that they follow these principles. We believe that such assumptions about the
intellectual powers of players are within the realm of both epistemic and game-theoretical
reasoning.
11.5 Do we need the full power of S5?
The full power of the logic S5 was used in Theorem 3, which states that a KBR-solution
always exists and that rational and intelligent players follow this solution. However, in
specific games, KBR-solutions can be logically derived by more modest epistemic means.
For example, in Game I of Section 8, it suffices to apply negative introspection to epistemic
conditions (16) to derive the KBR-solution and to conclude that players will follow this
solution. Roughly speaking, it suffices to add to the game specification that epistemic
conditions (16) are known to corresponding players and to reason in the logic S4, which
is S5 without the negative introspection principle. These considerations could appeal to
epistemologists and modal logicians who might have reservations concerning the use of
powerful epistemic principles such as negative introspection. Using S4 has some additional
advantages, e.g., it renders the reasoning monotonic in a logical sense, admits natural
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evidence analysis in the style of [1, 2] where one could hope to produce verified best known
strategies for players, etc.
11.6 Learning
It is obvious that more player knowledge at a given node yields a greater highest known
payoff. However, a greater actual payoff, which could depend on other players’ choices, is
not guaranteed at this node. Moreover, it is possible that a player A with superior knowl-
edge of the game can manipulate B’s rational choices by leaking truthful, but incomplete,
information, which changes B’s best known move to A’s advantage.
11.7 More rationality principles
In this paper, we do not provide a complete logical description of rationality but rather use
some of its commonly accepted features, e.g., the Rationality Thesis (Definition 3), to find
solutions for games. The question of what the logical properties of rationality are remains
open.
Consider rationality principle (9). It is tempting to extend it to a complete-looking
definition of rationality:
rA ↔ [kbestA(j)↔ sj] (27)
or something of this sort. We believe this is not a good idea. First, condition
[kbestA(j)↔ sj]
describes rational behavior of the player at one particular node of the game, which itself is
not sufficient for stating rationality in general. So, condition (27), as stated, is just wrong.
One can also argue that reducing rationality to the making of rational choices at all
nodes of the game does not work either. If the player is not rational, it does not mean that
he must make irrational choices at any of the nodes. He might as well choose the same
moves as a rational player by some other means, e.g., by chance, etc.
However, irrationality seems to possess a definite epistemic meaning: if, by the rules of
the game, B does not know that A is rational, B cannot apply the Rationality Principle
(Definition 3) to predict A’s behavior. Under these assumptions, unless some specific
information tells B otherwise, a risk-averse B has strong reason to assume, as part of the
game description, that at a given node, any legitimate move by A is possible.∧
j≤m
3B(sj) . (28)
According to (28), rationality is more than just a conjunction of rational choices in a given
game. Rationality is, rather, a reputation: if A possesses it (in B’s eyes), then B counts
on A’s rational behavior at any node. Otherwise, if B does not know that A is rational, B
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just does not try to predict A’s behavior on grounds of rationality and considers any move
by A possible.
Note that as stated, (28) is not a new logical rule, but rather a formalization method-
ology, which was used to describe games in Sections 3 and 8. Adopting (28) has no bearing
on the main results of this paper, which describe how games are played after formalization.
11.8 What’s next?
The knowledge-based theory of rationality decisions advocates studying games in their
entirety, including comprehensive epistemic conditions. Here are some possible avenues of
research for logic-based game-theoretical models.
• Studying specific games in their entirety, with various epistemic conditions.
• Incorporating a probabilistic approach and mixed strategies into the KBR-model.
• Developing a mechanism of justification-tracking in game-theoretical reasoning.
• Introducing tools to control logical omniscience hidden in the KBR-approach.
• Capturing the process of acquiring knowledge during games.
• Incorporating other epistemic notions into the model.
• Developing a theory of decision-making based on beliefs rather then knowledge.
• Studying logical properties and new principles of rationality.
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